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ABSTRACT 
Article 39(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 (CISG) imposes a cut-off 
period on the buyer's remedies for the delivery of non-conforming goods, 
depriving the buyer of all remedies under the CISG if he has not given 
notice of non-conformity to the seller within two years after the goods 
were handed over.  
Despite the fact that the CISG itself contains no rules on the 
limitation of actions (prescription), courts in various jurisdictions have 
held that Article 39(2) CISG pre-empts the application of limitation 
periods under domestic laws that are shorter than two years – a practically 
relevant scenario, because a significant number of domestic laws 
throughout the world know relatively brief limitation periods. The present 
article challenges this approach and argues that the prevailing 
interpretation of Article 39(2) CISG inter alia overlooks the provision's 
systematic function as a mere supplement to Article 39(1) CISG, with its 
cut-off rule applying only where the defect remained undetectable for the 
buyer. Even more importantly, the prevailing opinion misunderstands 
Article 39(2) CISG’s purpose of exclusively protecting the seller’s 
interests, and not the buyer’s – if the provision is (mis-)construed as 
displacing limitation periods that would otherwise prevent buyers’ claims 
from being exercised, Article 39(2) CISG is turned into a rule that protects 
the buyer’s interest, thereby violating its purpose. 
The article therefore concludes that no conflict exists between the 
CISG's two-year cut-off rule and shorter domestic limitation periods. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Joseph Lookofsky, in whose honour the present 
contribution was written, has devoted a significant part of his oeuvre to 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods of 11 April 1980 (CISG). Having published his first article on the 
CISG very soon after the Convention had been adopted,1 he has since 
authored contributions on almost every interpretative issue under the 
CISG and has also actively accompanied new developments in 
international sales law, as the recent withdrawals of the Nordic 
declarations under Article 92 CISG and their consequences.2 In doing so, 
                                                            
1 His first contribution listed in the bibliography of the Albert H Kritzer CISG Database 
is J Lookofsky, ‘CISG: The Basis of Liability. A comparative analysis of the fault and no-
fault theories of contractual liability pursuant to the Danish Sale of Goods Act, the 
American Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods’ (1981) 4(5) Justitia Copenhagen, 1–72. 
2 See J Lookofsky, ‘The Rise and Fall of CISG Article 92’ in P Mankowski and W 
Wurmnest (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Magnus (Sellier 2014), 243ff as well as the papers in J 
Lookofsky and MB Andersen (eds), The CISG Convention and Domestic Contract Law: 
Harmony, Cross-Inspiration, or Discord? (Djøf / Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 2014). 
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he has greatly contributed to the quest for an interpretation of the CISG’s 
provisions which is both practically sensible and internationally uniform 
(see Article 7(1) CISG). While one part of this quest, namely the 
Convention’s interpretation by courts in the various Contracting States, 
has been likened to an orchestra without conductor,3 the related 
discussions between CISG commentators resemble a global academic 
town hall meeting, with a free exchange of ideas in search for the best 
solution. In this spirit, the following pages will similarly be dedicated to 
the identification and discussion of a question that arises, because ‘the 
CISG is not always understood by all arbiters and commentators in an 
identical way’, and that Professor Lookofsky has aptly characterised as 
‘anomalies, particularly as they impact on merchants (and their lawyers) in 
the real CISG world’.4 
1.1. TRACING THE BORDERLINE BETWEEN THE CISG AND DOMESTIC 
LAW 
A general issue that features particularly prominently in Professor 
Lookofsky’s writings is the delimitation of the CISG’s sphere of 
application and the relationship between the Convention and domestic 
law.5 In this context, he has cautioned against ‘running wild with the 
CISG’,6 warning that ‘those who run wild with the CISG – stretching its 
borders to solve controversial problems it was not designed to solve – 
might unwittingly provide commercial certainty-seekers with an excuse to 
opt out of the Convention regime altogether’.7 The point is well taken. 
And although I suspect that I may well qualify as a CISG academic running 
wild in the eyes of some, given the positions that I have advocated 
elsewhere on the relationship between the CISG and domestic remedies 
for misrepresentation8 or on the ‘validity exception’ in Article 4 sentence 
2(a) CISG,9 I will in the following join those who argue in favour of a 
                                                            
3 P Schlechtriem, ‘Einheitskaufrecht in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs’ in 
C-W Canaris and others (eds), 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof: Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, Vol. 1: 
Bürgerliches Recht (CH Beck 2000) 407, 408. 
4 J Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG (5th edn, Kluwer 2017) xi. 
5 See eg J Lookofsky, ‘CISG Case Commentary on Preëmption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
and Stawski’ [2003–2004] Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sales of Goods 115ff. 
6 J Lookofsky, ‘Not Running Wild with the CISG’ (2011) 29 JL & Com 141. 
7 ibid 144. 
8 UG Schroeter, ‘Defining the Borders of Uniform International Contract Law: The 
CISG and Remedies for Innocent, Negligent or Fraudulent Misrepresentation’ (2013) 58 
Villanova Law Review (Vill L Rev) 553. 
9 UG Schroeter, ‘The Validity of International Sales Contracts: Irrelevance of the 
”Validity Exception” in Article 4 Vienna Sales Convention and a Novel Approach to 
Determining the Convention’s Scope’ in I Schwenzer and L Spagnolo (eds), Boundaries 
and Intersections: The 5th Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference (Eleven International 
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narrower construction of the Convention, as far as one borderline issue is 
concerned. 
1.2. FIXED TIME-LIMITS FOR THE BUYER’S RIGHTS IN CASES OF NON-
CONFORMING GOODS AS A BORDERLINE ISSUE 
The borderline issue to be discussed in the present contribution is 
the application of fixed time-limits to the buyer’s rights arising from a 
delivery of non-conforming goods (Article 45 CISG). In his seminal book 
on the CISG, Professor Lookofsky merely touches upon this matter in 
passing, inviting the reader in a footnote to ‘compare’ a decision by a Swiss 
court10 in which the problem was first addressed.11 Accepting this 
invitation, the following remarks will try to compare the position adopted 
by courts and academic writers12 with an alternative view to be developed 
below.13  
1.2.1. THE CUT-OFF PERIOD IN ARTICLE 39(2) CISG 
The only time-limit in the CISG that takes the form of a fixed period 
(and not a flexible period, as notably the ubiquitous ‘reasonable time’14) is 
found in Article 39(2).15 Article 39 CISG reads: 
‘(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a 
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the 
goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years 
from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this 
time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.’ 
At the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the two-year cut-off period 
in Article 39(2) CISG was one of the most contentious issues in the entire 
Convention,16 variously described by commentators as ‘probably the most 
                                                            
Publishing 2014) 95; UG Schroeter, ‘Contract Validity and the CISG’ (2017) 22 Uniform 
Law Review 47. 
10 Cour de Justice Genève 10 October 1997, CISG-online 295, Schweizerische Juristen-
Zeitung (SJZ) 1998, 146, to be further discussed below at 2.2.1. 
11 J Lookofsky, ‘Understanding’ (n 4) §4.10; similarly J Lookofsky, Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2016) 136. 
12 See 2. below. 
13 See 3. below. 
14 Throughout its text, the CISG uses the term ‘reasonable time’ no less than fifteen times 
(in Arts 18(2), 33(c), 39(1), 43(1), 46(2), (3), 48(2), 49(2)(a), (b), 64(2)(b), 65(1), (2), 73(2), 
75(2) and 79(4) CISG). 
15 This statement only takes into account time-limits directed at the parties to 
international sales contracts. In addition, Part IV of the CISG contains some fixed 
periods applicable to declarations under public international law made by Contracting 
States to the CISG. 
16 P Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law – The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 70; I Schwenzer in I Schwenzer (ed), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 
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heatedly debated’ provision17 or ‘one of the most dramatic debates’ of the 
conference.18 Professors Enderlein and Maskow explain:  
‘Latent defects, which in spite of an examination at the time of the taking over 
of the goods could not be discovered, can become visible while the goods are being used. 
The later the defects are discovered, the more difficult it is to decide whether they were 
caused by a breach of an obligation of the seller or by outside influence after the passing 
of the risk, eg wrong use by the buyer or normal wear and tear. Therefore, a maximum 
period of two years after the taking over of the goods is laid down in the Convention. 
[…] This exclusive period was greatly disputed during the preparation of the 
Convention […]. After long discussions, a two-year exclusive period was stipulated in 
the CISG because at a later date difficulties would almost inevitably arise with regard 
to evidence on the status of the goods at the time of delivery, and the seller would no 
longer be in a position to take action against his suppliers (of the goods themselves or of 
the material needed for their manufacture). A period that would be equally suitable for 
all goods cannot be established. Whether or not the two-year period is too short or too 
long depends on the goods in question [...].’19 
1.2.2. THE LIMITATION (PRESCRIPTION) UNDER DOMESTIC LAWS 
By contrast, the CISG contains no statute of limitations, because 
time-limits for bringing legal actions (limitation or prescription) are 
generally considered to be a matter not governed by the Convention.20 
When the CISG was drafted, questions relating to the limitation of actions 
were intentionally left to ‘UNCITRAL's first-born’,21 the Convention on 
the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods that was first 
                                                            
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), (4th edn, OUP 
2016) Art 39 para 2. 
17 K Sono in CM Bianca and MJ Bonell (eds), Commentary on the International Sales Law 
(Rothman 1987) Art 44 para 1.2. 
18 G Eörsi, ‘A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ (1983) 31 American Journal of Comparative Law 333, 350. 
19 F Enderlein and D Maskow, International Sales Law (Oceana 1992) Art 39 CISG para 6, 
citing K Sono in CM Bianca and MJ Bonell (n 17) Art 39 para 1.11. 
20 ICC Arbitration Case No 11333 of 2002, (2006) 31 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(YB Comm Arb) 117, 124–25; Cour d’appel (Court of Appeals) de Versailles 13 October 
2005, CISG-online 1433; US Nonwovens v Pack Line Corp, Supreme Court of the State of 
New York, 12 March 2015, CISG-online 2676; JO Honnold and HM Flechtner, Uniform 
Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (4th edn, Kluwer 2009) 
§ 254.2; P Schlechtriem and UG Schroeter, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht (6th edn, Mohr 
Siebeck 2016) para 200. Only very rarely has opposition been voiced by academic writers, 
see A Williams, ‘Limitations on Uniformity in International Sales Law: A Reasoned 
Argument for the Application of a Standard Limitation Period Under the Provisions of 
the CISG’ (2006) 10 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration (VJ) 229, 244–59. What is less clear are the precise consequences of the CISG 
not governing prescription; see 3.1.2. below. 
21 See H Smit, ‘The Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of 
Goods: UNCITRAL’s First-Born’ (1975) 23 Am J Comp L 337–62. 
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adopted in New York on 14 June 1974 and subsequently modified during 
the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna in order to make it compatible 
with the new CISG. Therefore, it was probably the Limitation 
Convention’s four-year limitation period (Article 8 Limitation 
Convention) which was primarily present in the CISG drafters’ minds 
when Article 39(2) CISG was discussed, given that the coexistence 
between these two different-but-related time-limits did not seem to 
adversely affect the CISG’s two-year cut-off period.22  
The situation can be different whenever Article 39(2) CISG has to 
coexist with a domestic limitation period that is shorter than two years. 
The laws of a surprisingly large number of CISG Contracting States 
impose such relatively brief limitation periods on buyers’ claims, an 
approach that often can be traced back to Roman law under which a 
buyer’s actio redhibitoria or actio quanti minoris had to be brought within short 
time-limits.23 Currently, limitation periods that run for less than two years 
from the handing over of the goods can e.g. be found in the domestic laws 
of African States (Madagascar, Morocco and Tunisia – thirty days; Egypt 
– sixty days, six months or one year; Algeria, Libya and Syria – six months 
or one year), of American States (Brazil – thirty days; Peru and Venezuela 
– three months; Bolivia – one year; Mexico – six months; Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador – six months or one year), of Asian 
States or territories (Taiwan – six months; Cambodia – one year), of 
European States (Spain – six months; Italy – one year) and of Middle-
Eastern States (Lebanon – thirty days; United Arab Emirates – sixty days 
or six months; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Yemen – six months or one 
year).24 In addition, many African States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, 
Mali, Niger and Togo) as well as Belgium and Luxembourg have 
maintained the rule formerly contained in Article 1648 French Civil Code, 
according to which an action for a hidden defect must be brought within 
a short time (bref délai). 
Furthermore, a number of European States until not too long ago 
also had short limitation periods for buyers’ action for defects, but have 
since replaced them either in the course of implementing the 1999 EU 
Consumer Sales Directive (which requires a two-year limitation period for 
                                                            
22 Compare eg Secretariat’s Commentary in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Vienna 10 March – 11 April 1980, Official Records: Documents of the 
Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and the Meetings of the Main Committees 
(United Nations 1981) Art 37 para 6, p 35; I Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 31. 
23 See R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(OUP 1996) 305, 317–18, 327–28. 
24 I Schwenzer, P Hachem and C Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law (OUP 2012) 
para 51.27; E Muñoz, Modern Law of Contracts and Sales in Latin America, Spain and Portugal 
(Eleven International Publishing 2011) 524ff. 
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consumer sales)25 or in unrelated domestic law reforms. Examples include 
Germany and Greece, which until 2001/2002 respectively had a limitation 
period of six months,26 as well as Switzerland, which in 2013 replaced its 
traditional one-year limitation period for buyers’ claims for non-
conformity with a two-year period.27 It was primarily those three rather 
brief limitation periods (now all abolished) that in the past gave rise to 
discussions about the relationship between Article 39(2) CISG and shorter 
domestic limitation periods. However, the topic is of general importance 
and continuing practical relevance, given the numerous similar limitation 
laws cited above.28 
2. THE CUT-OFF PERIOD IN ARTICLE 39(2) CISG AND 
SHORTER DOMESTIC LIMITATION PERIODS: THE 
PREVAILING VIEW 
While the ‘prevailing view’ upon a given interpretative question may 
sometimes be difficult to identify,29 such a difficulty hardly arises in the 
present context: As will be demonstrated in the following section,30 courts 
from a number of CISG Contracting States, academic writers from various 
countries as well as the domestic legislators that have addressed the 
question almost unanimously agree that limitation periods of less than two 
years are incompatible with the cut-off period in Article 39(2) CISG. In 
contrast, there is significantly less agreement about the precise effect that 
the alleged incompatibility has upon the application of domestic limitation 
laws.31 
                                                            
25 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] 
OJ L171/12, Art 5(1). 
26 § 477 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) as in force until 31 December 2001 
contained a six-months limitation period for the buyer’s rights which commenced with 
the handing-over of the goods. Since 1 January 2002, the new § 438(1) No 3 German 
Civil Code instead provides for a two-year limitation period; see in more detail 2.1.3.1. 
below. Similarly, Greece amended Art 554 of the Greek Civil Code through Law 
No 3043/2002 (which entered in force on 21 August 2002) and replaced the former 
limitation period of six months with a two-year limitation period. 
27 See further 2.1.3.2. below. 
28 See in this sense also I Schwenzer, P Hachem and C Kee (n 24) para 51.31: ‘Although 
this problem arises in many civil law legal systems – especially in Latin America – up to 
now it has been discussed in Germany and Switzerland only’. 
29 Compare the critical remarks by J Lookofsky, ‘Running Wild’ (n 6) 143 on the oblique 
use of the term ‘prevailing opinion’ by German authors (like myself).  
30 See 2.1. below. 
31 See 2.2. below. 
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2.1. THE ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ARTICLE 39(2) CISG 
AND SHORTER DOMESTIC LIMITATION PERIODS 
2.1.1. CASE LAW 
In case law under the Convention, courts have almost uniformly held 
that the two-year cut-off period in Article 39(2) CISG is ‘incompatible’ or 
‘in conflict’ with shorter limitation periods. Maybe most prominently, the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court described the underlying reasoning as 
follows: 
‘Pursuant to Article 210 OR [Obligationenrecht – Swiss Law of Obligations], 
a buyer’s claims arising out of a lack of conformity of the goods become time-barred one 
year after the goods have been delivered to it by the seller. In certain cases, an application 
of this one-year limitation period (Article 210 OR) to contracts governed by the CISG 
will be problematic: It might happen that claims arising out of a lack of conformity of 
the goods would already be time-barred although the period for notification under Article 
39(2) CISG has not even expired. As stated earlier, the buyer loses the right to rely on 
a lack of conformity of the goods in accordance with Article 39(2) CISG if he does not 
give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date on 
which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer. Therefore, legal scholars tend to 
argue that Article 210 OR should be inapplicable to sales contracts governed by the 
CISG. The Court holds that this is an appropriate solution. The one-year limitation 
period provided for in Article 210 OR cannot be applied at least to those cases where 
it would subject a claim to limitation even before the two-year notification period of 
Article 39(2) CISG has expired. Otherwise, there would be a violation of provisions 
of public international law.’32 
In addition to various earlier decisions by Swiss courts of first and 
second instance which had considered the one-year statute of limitation 
under the former Article 210(1) OR to be incompatible with Article 39(2) 
CISG,33 at least two Greek courts adopted the same position with respect 
to the former Article 554 Greek Civil Code and its six-months limitation 
period, expressly referring to the discussion in Switzerland and following 
                                                            
32 Bundesgericht (Swiss Federal Supreme Court) 18 May 2009, CISG-online 1900, (2008) 
8 Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR) 27 para 10.3, referring to Art 210 OR as in force 
until 31 December 2012 and citing C Brunner, UN-Kaufrecht – CISG (Stämpfli 2004) Art 
4 para 25; F Dasser in Basler Kommentar, Internationales Privatrecht (2nd edn, Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn 2007) Art 148 IPRG para 3; H Honsell, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, 
Besonderer Teil (8th edn, Stämpfli 2006) 154; M Keller and D Girsberger in Zürcher 
Kommentar zum IPRG (2nd edn, Schulthess 2004) Art 148 IPRG para 7; T Koller, ‘Die 
Verjährung von Ansprüchen des Käufers aus der Lieferung nicht vertragskonformer 
Ware im Spannungsfeld zwischen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) und nationalem 
Partikularrecht’ (2003) 21 recht 41, 47ff; M Will, ‘Zum Wiener UN-
Kaufrecht/Verjährung’ (1998) 94 SJZ 146ff. This decision was later approvingly referred 
to in Bundesgericht 16 July 2012, CISG-online 2371, Entscheidungen des 
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE) 138 III 601 para 7.5. 
33 See 2.2. below. 
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its reasoning.34 An Italian court similarly declared the one-year limitation 
period in Article 1495(3) Italian Civil Code to be incompatible with Article 
39(2) CISG.35 
In comparison, French courts have demonstrated a range of 
approaches when addressing Article 39(2) CISG’s relationship with 
domestic laws on limitation. For example, the Lyon court of appeal36 
applied the former Article 210(1) OR to a CISG contract without even 
mentioning Article 39(2) CISG.37 After the French Supreme Court had 
reversed the decision for procedural reasons and remanded the case to the 
Paris court of appeal,38 the latter court ruled that Article 210(1) OR as then 
in force violated French public policy, since its one-year period could 
elapse before the last seller could take recourse against earlier sellers in the 
chain.39 In doing so, the court looked only at the ’black letter’ of Swiss law, 
without taking into account its flexible interpretation by the Swiss courts 
(to be addressed below).40 A mere 20 days later, the Bordeaux court of 
appeal explicitly rejected the same public policy argument when it was 
raised against Article 1495(1) Italian Civil Code.41 In an earlier case, the 
same court had seen no conflict between these two bodies of law in the 
first place, because it had interpreted the CISG as entirely pre-empting the 
limitation period in Article 1495(3) Italian Civil Code.42 As the court had 
furthermore found the time-limits of Article 39 CISG to be inapplicable 
                                                            
34 Monomeles Protodikio Larisa (Single-Member Court of First Instance of Larissa) Case 
No 165/2005, reported by E Zervogianni, ‘Greece’ in F Ferrari (ed), The CISG and its 
Impact on National Legal Systems (Sellier 2008) 172ff; Polimeles Protodikio Athinon (Multi-
Member Court of First Instance of Athens) Case No 4505/2009, CISG-online 2228, 
para 2.2.6. 
35 Tribunale di Bolzano (District Court Bolzano) 27 January 2009, CISG-online 2344, 
(2012) 12 IHR 42, 43. But see Hof van Beroep (Belgian Appellate Court) Ghent 17 May 
2004 – Noma BVBA v Misa Sud Refrigerazione SpA, CISG-online 990, para. 6.2, where the 
court applied Art 39(2) CISG and Art 1495(3) Italian Civil Code concurrently (given that 
a full seven years had passed since the delivery of the goods and six years since the 
discovery of the defect, the relationship between the two time-limits arguably did not 
matter in this case, as both periods had clearly expired). 
36 Cour d’appel de Lyon 22 June 2010, Docket No 08/08864. 
37 The decision has been criticised by C Witz and B Köhler, ’Der neueste Beitrag der 
französischen Gerichte zur Auslegung des CISG (2012–Juli 2013)’ (2014) 14 IHR 89, 94. 
38 Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale (French Supreme Court, commercial 
chamber) 13 February 2013 – Société Solodem v Soctiété Codefine, CISG-online 2435. 
39 Cour d'appel de Paris 10 April 2015, CISG-online No 2708. 
40 See on the ’Geneva approach’ 2.2.1 and on the ’Berne approach’ 2.2.2. below. 
Criticising the Paris court of appeal’s decision in this regard C Witz and B Köhler, 
'Panorama: Droit uniforme de la vente internationale de marchandises (janvier 2015–
juillet 2016)’ (2017) Recueil Dalloz (D) 613, 620. 
41 Cour d'appel de Bordeaux 30 April 2015, CISG-online 2707; approving discussion by 
C Witz and B Köhler, 'Panorama’ (n 40) 620-21. 
42 Cour d'appel de Bordeaux 12 September 2013 – Sociéte Ceramiche v Société Bois, CISG-
online 2552. 
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due to Article 40 CISG, the claim concerned was effectively free from any 
time-limits. The French Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held 
limitation periods to be outside of the CISG’s scope, but did not address 
their possible incompatibility with Article 39(2) CISG.43  
2.1.2. SCHOLARLY WRITINGS 
Mirroring the CISG case law mentioned earlier, academic writers 
almost uniformly agree that domestic limitation periods of less than two 
years are incompatible with Article 39(2) CISG.44 In doing so, they also 
frequently echo the Swiss Supreme Court’s view that an application of 
such statutes of limitation would constitute a violation of public 
international law.45 Only exceptionally have authors argued in favour of a 
different position (among them the author of the present contribution).46 
                                                            
43 Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 2 November 2016 – Société Bois v Société 
Cermiche, CISG-online 2804; critical remarks on the reasoning C Witz and B Köhler, 
'Panorama’ (n 40) 619. 
44 F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19) Art 39 CISG para 6; P Tannò, Die Berechnung der 
Rügefrist im schweizerischen, deutschen und UN-Kaufrecht (Dike 1993) 288; V Heuzé, Traité des 
Contrats: La vente internationale de marchandises – Droit uniforme, (LGDJ 2000) para 313; J-M 
Joerin, ‘Discrepancies Between Lack of Conformity Notification Requirements in CISG 
39(2) and the Statute of Limitations in CO 210(1): Gap Filling by Arbitral Tribunals or 
Prerogative of Legislator?’ (2000) 18 ASA Bull. 82, 83; M Will, ‘“Meine Großmutter in 
der Schweiz…”: Zum Konflikt zwischen Verjährung und Rügefrist nach UN-Kaufrecht’ 
in T Rauscher and H-P Mansel (eds), Festschrift für Werner Lorenz zum 80. Geburtstag (CH 
Beck 2001) 623, 626; A Janssen, ‘Das Verhältnis nationaler Verjährungsvorschriften zur 
Ausschlussfrist des Art. 39 Abs. 2 CISG in der Schweiz’ [2003] Praxis des Internationalen 
Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 369, 370; T Koller, (n 32) 47; D Girsberger, ‘The 
Time Limits of Article 39 CISG’ (2005-06) 25 J L & Com 241, 249; I Schwenzer and S 
Manner, ‘“The Claim is Time-Barred”: The Proper Limitation Regime for International 
Sales Contracts in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2007) 23 Arb. Int. 293, 305; P 
Hachem and F Mohs, ‘Verjährung von Ansprüchen des Käufers wegen Nichtlieferung 
und Lieferung vertragswidriger Ware aus CISG nach internem Schweizer Recht: Zugleich 
eine Urteilsanmerkung zum Entscheid des Bundesgerichts vom 18. Mai 2009, CISG-
online 1900’, (2009) 18 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP) 1541, 1547; St Kröll in St Kröll, 
L Mistelis and P Perales Viscasillas (eds), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) Commentary (CH Beck 2011) Art 39 para 121; F Ferrari in F Ferrari and 
others (eds), Internationales Vertragsrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2012) Art 39 CISG para 34; I 
Schwenzer, P Hachem and C Kee (n 24) para 51.31; C Witz, ’Panorama: Droit uniforme 
de la vente internationale de marchandises (janvier 2012–juillet 2013)’ (2013) Recueil 
Dalloz (D.) 2874, 2877; T Murmann and M Stucki in C Brunner (ed), UN-Kaufrecht – 
CISG, (2nd edn, Stämpfli 2014) Art 4 para 23; C Witz and B Köhler, ‘Auslegung des 
CISG 2012-2013’ (n 37) 94; C Witz and B Köhler, 'Panorama’ (n 40) 619. 
45 M Will (n 44) 635; T Koller (n 32), 47; P Hachem and F Mohs (n 44) 1547; T Murmann 
and M Stucki (n 44) Art 4 para 23; C Witz and B Köhler, ‘Auslegung des CISG 2012-
2013’ (n 37) 94. 
46 A Mullis in P Huber and A Mullis, The CISG – A new Textbook for Students and Practioners 
(Sellier 2007) 163; P Schlechtriem and UG Schroeter (n 20) para 428; R Gildeggen and 
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2.1.3. DOMESTIC LEGISLATORS 
Furthermore, it is instructive to consider the view of domestic 
legislators in some CISG Contracting States who have also identified an 
incompatibility between Article 39(2) CISG and their brief statutes of 
limitation. The reason why their position is mentioned last in the present 
context lies in the inherent risk to the international character of the 
Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its application, which 
are both listed in Article 7(1) CISG as interpretative goalposts:47 With the 
ratification of the CISG, the legislative organs of ratifying States relinquish 
their influence on the content of the Convention48 and leave all 
interpretative power to the community of courts in CISG Contracting 
States.49 Any guidance from a Contracting State about the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of CISG provisions – may it be in form of an interpretative 
declaration50 or a domestic law51 – therefore constitutes a threat to Article 
7(1) CISG’s principles and should be avoided. Against this background, 
domestic legislators’ opinion about the issue discussed here must similarly 
be viewed through an Article 7(1) CISG lens. 
As far as could be ascertained, there are in any case only two States 
in which the domestic legislator has specifically addressed the relationship 
between Article 39(2) CISG and the local statute of limitation: 
                                                            
A Willburger, ‘Art. 39 Abs. 2 CISG als Problem bei internationalen Einkaufsvertra ̈gen’ 
(2016) 16 IHR 1, 3; P Hachem, ‘The CISG and Statute of Limitation’ in I Schwenzer 
(ed), 35 years CISG and beyond (Eleven International Publishing 2016) 151, 163; P Hachem, 
‘Verja ̈hrungs- und Verwirkungsfragen bei CISG-Vertra ̈gen’ (2017) 17 IHR 1, 16. 
47 Compare HM Flechtner, ‘Uniformity and Politics: Interpreting and Filling Gaps in the 
CISG’ in P Mankowski and W Wurmnest (n 2) 193, 197ff, who convincingly points out 
that the two interpretative principles should not be equated with each other. 
48 Although the text of the CISG was fixed when the Convention was adopted in Vienna 
on 11 April 1980, individual States retained the possibility to declare one or more of the 
reservations authorized in Arts 92–96 CISG, thereby influencing the text version to be 
applied; see HM Flechtner, ‘The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: 
Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity 
Principle in Article 7(1)’ (1998) 17 Journal of Law and Commerce 187, 194. See also J 
Basedow, ‘Uniform Private Law Conventions and the Law of Treaties’ (2006) 11 
Uniform Law Review 731, 735: ‘With the exception of reservations permitted in the 
convention, the binding treaty only leaves national legislators a choice between ”yes” and 
”no”.’ 
49 UG Schroeter, ‘Backbone or Backyard of the Convention? The CISG’s Final 
Provisions’ in CB Andersen and UG Schroeter (eds), Sharing International Commercial Law 
across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday 
(Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2008) 425, 455. 
50 As eg the Hungarian declaration on Art 90 CISG or the German declaration on Art 
1(1)(b) and Art 95 CISG; see UG Schroeter, ‘Final Provisions’ (n 49) 452–54. 
51 As eg the laws interpreting Art 6 CISG enacted by many Canadian provinces; see J 
Ziegel, ‘Canada Prepares to Adopt the International Sales Convention’ (1991) 18 
Canadian Business Law Journal 1, 3. 
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Germany 
When the ratification of the CISG was prepared in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1988, the staff in the Federal Ministry of Justice 
noticed the discrepancy between the then six-months limitation period in 
§ 477 of the German BGB and the two-year cut-off period in Article 39(2) 
CISG. The explanations to the parliamentary act of ratification therefore 
explain that an unfettered application of § 477 BGB could lead to 
‘problems’ if the buyer did not and could not identify the non-conformity 
with these six months, as his rights would then be affected by limitation, 
although Article 39(2) CISG gives him the right to rely on a non-
conformity until two years have passed since the goods were actually 
handed over.52 ‘In order to not erode’ the latter provision through the 
short limitation period in § 477 BGB,53 a special provision was introduced 
in Article 3 of the Act implementing the CISG into German law 
(Vertragsgesetz)54 according to which the limitation period only began to run 
in case of CISG contracts at the moment the buyer had given notice of 
non-conformity in accordance with Article 39(1) CISG. 
In doing so, the German legislator removed every potential for 
conflict between § 477 BGB and Article 39(2) CISG, because the 
limitation period only ever commenced once a notice of non-conformity 
had been given by the buyer, while Article 39(2) CISG concerns situations 
in which no notice under Article 39(1) CISG was given. Notwithstanding 
this effective legislative solution, it is interesting to note that the travaux 
préparatoires remain surprisingly vague when it comes to the question 
whether there was, legally speaking, a conflict of norms looming between 
the two provisions, or whether it was merely an unfortunate practical 
effect the German legislator sought to avoid. The non-legalistic terms 
employed in the parliamentary materials (‘problems’ (‘könnte allerdings zu 
Problemen führen (…)’), avoiding an ‘erosion’ of the two-year cut-off period 
(‘Um diese Regelung nicht durch die (…) kurze Verjährungfrist auszuhöhlen’)) 
hardly support the assessment of a true conflict between § 477 BGB and 
Article 39(2) CISG, so that the German legislator should arguably not be 
counted among those that regard the CISG’s cut-off period and shorter 
limitation periods as legally incompatible. 
                                                            
52 Deutscher Bundestag (German Federal Parliament), 11. Wahlperiode, Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den 
internationalen Warenkauf sowie zur Änderung des Gesetzes zu dem Übereinkommen vom 19. Mai 
1956 über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen Straßengüterverkehr (CMR) of 7 October 
1988, Drucksache 11/3076, 7. 
53 ibid. 
54 Gesetz zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über 
Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf sowie zur Änderung des Gesetzes zu dem 
Übereinkommen vom 19. Mai 1956 über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen 
Straßengüterverkehr (CMR) of 5 July 1989, Bundesgesetzblatt (German Federal Legal 
Gazette) 1989 II, 586. 
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The rule in Article 3 of the German Vertragsgesetz remained in force 
until 31 December 2001, when the provision was changed in connection 
with a fundamental overhaul of the German law on limitation periods. In 
this context, § 477 BGB was replaced by a two-year period of limitation, 
which generally (including in case of CISG contracts) starts to run with 
the delivery of the goods.55 The legislative materials on the modification 
of Article 3 Vertragsgesetz explain that postponing the beginning of the 
limitation period was viewed as ‘no longer necessary’, given the significant 
extension of its length from six months to two years.56 
Switzerland 
In Switzerland, where the CISG’s ratification was prepared soon 
after it had been in Germany, the time gap between Article 39(2) CISG 
and the local one-year limitation period (Article 210(1) OR) was equally 
noticed. The Swiss government’s explanations accompanying the 
parliamentary act of ratification pointed out that an ‘unsatisfactory 
solution’ could be the result for buyers wanting to bring an action in a 
Swiss court after a year has passed.57 Contrary to the German legislator, 
the Swiss parliament nevertheless at first took no steps to remedy the 
situation, but left it to the parties to solve the problem by contractually 
harmonising the two time-limits, merely noting that both Article 39(2) 
CISG’s cut-off period and the Swiss statute of limitation are subject to 
contrary party agreements.58  
The passive approach adopted by the Swiss legislator was soon 
criticized for merely shrugging the problem off,59 and the resulting conflict 
of norms was even referred to as ‘absurd’.60 The Swiss authorities took this 
criticism to heart and later expressly acknowledged the incompatibility with 
the CISG when the limitation period of Article 210(1) OR was extended 
in 2013.61 
                                                            
55 § 438(1) No 3, (2) BGB as in force since 1 January 2002. 
56 Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts of 14 May 2001, Drucksache 14/6040, 284. 
57 Botschaft betreffend das Wiener Übereinkommen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf 
of 11 January 1989, Bundesblatt (Swiss Federal Gazette) 1989, 745, 793: ‘(...) eine 
unbefriedigende Lösung (...)’. 
58 ibid. 
59 M Will (n 44) 631: ‘achselzuckender Hinweis’. 
60 P Widmer, ‘Droits et obligations du vendeur’ in Lausanne Colloquium, The 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods: Lausanne Colloquium of November 19–20, 1984 
(Schweizer Institut für Rechtsvergleichung 1985) 91, 102: ‘résultat peu convaincant – pour ne 
pas dire absurd –’. 
61 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Bundesamt für Justiz, Obligationenrecht 
(Revision des Verjährungsrechts), Bericht zum Vorentwurf (August 2011) 34: ‘Die allgemeinen 
Verjährungsregeln sind WKR-konform. Dies im Unterschied zum geltenden Recht. (...)’. 
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2.1.4. SUMMARY 
In summary, courts in various CISG Contracting States, the 
overwhelming majority of academic writers as well as domestic legislators 
all agree: According to them, the borderline issue of fixed time-limits for 
buyers’ rights under CISG contracts is marked by an incompatibility 
between Article 39(2) CISG and domestic limitation periods with a length 
of less than two years. 
2.2. THE ASSUMED INCOMPATIBILITY’S EFFECT ON THE APPLICATION 
OF DOMESTIC STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
What is less clear are the legal consequences to be drawn from this 
incompatibility. In other words: Who should do what about it? There is 
general agreement that the CISG must ‘prevail’,62 i.e. that the alleged 
conflict of norms needs to be resolved in favour of the CISG. Support 
can be found in the general law of treaties, where it has long been 
recognized as a rule of customary public international law that ‘[a] party 
[i.e. a State] may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty’:63 Since the application of a 
domestic statute of limitation in spite of its incompatibility with Article 
39(2) CISG would constitute a partial failure to perform the treaty 
(through non-application of Article 39(2) CISG), such a step would be a 
violation of treaty law. However, neither the general law of treaties nor the 
CISG specify how the full application of the CISG’s provisions can be 
achieved in a situation in which a domestic statute of limitation, similarly 
equipped with the force of law, on its face also demands to be applied. 
When the incompatibility issue addressed above was discussed at an 
academic conference in Lausanne in 1985, Professor Loewe (who had 
acted as Chairman of the First Committee during the 1980 Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference) described the two generally available ways of 
solving the difficulty: In such a situation, a Contracting State has to resolve 
the conflict either through legislature or through judicature.64 Presented 
with these options, only the German parliament tried to remedy the 
situation through an express tailor-made provision,65 while legislators in 
                                                            
62 Tribunale di Bolzano 27 January 2009 (n 35) 43; D Girsberger (n 44) 249: ‘no doubt’; 
St. Kröll (n 44) Art 39 para 121; F Ferrari (n 44) Art 39 CISG para 34; I Schwenzer, P 
Hachem and C Kee (n 24) para 51.32. 
63 Article 27 first sentence Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 
1969, opened for signature 23 May 1969 and entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331. This provision codifies a rule of customary law; see ME Villiger, Commentary 
on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill 2009) Art 27 para 1; K 
Schmalenbach in O Dörr and K Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Springer 2012) Art 27 para 4. 
64 R Loewe, ’Discussion’ in Lausanne Colloquium (n 60) 106: ‘Hier müsse ein solcher Staat 
eine Lösung zur Vereinbarung dieser beiden Fristen durch Gesetzgebung und Judikatur finden.’ 
Accord F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19) Art 39 CISG para 6. 
65 See on the former Art 3 Vertragsgesetz 2.1.3.1. above. 
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all other States left it to the courts to handle the situation. In the resulting 
case law,66 two approaches can be distinguished:67 
2.2.1. EXTENSION OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD (“GENEVA APPROACH”) 
The first approach consists in an extension of shorter domestic 
limitation periods to a period of two years. It was adopted by the Court of 
Justice Geneva in a 1997 decision68 based on the authorization granted to 
Swiss courts in Article 1(2) Swiss Civil Code to act modo legislatoris;69 it has 
therefore become known as the ‘Geneva approach’. Many academic 
writers agree with this solution.70 
2.2.2. POSTPONING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD 
(‘BERNE APPROACH’) 
The second approach does not focus on the length of the limitation 
period, but rather its beginning, which under many domestic limitation 
statutes is the moment the goods are handed over (or ‘delivered’) to the 
buyer. By instead letting the limitation period commence only with the 
receipt of the notice of non-conformity given in accordance with Article 
39(1) CISG,71 the Commercial Court of the (Swiss) Canton Berne chose 
an alternative path towards removing the presumed incompatibility (the 
‘Berne approach’). In doing so, it relied on Article 1(2) Swiss Civil Code 
(as the Geneva court had done), but followed the solution implemented 
by the German legislator in the then Article 3 German Vertragsgesetz. The 
                                                            
66 Note that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court explicitly left open how the incompatibility 
should be resolved; see Bundesgericht (n 32) 27 para. 10.3. 
67 In addition, commentators have suggested yet different approaches, as eg the 
application of a longer, ‘general’ limitation period (where available); see S Marchand, Les 
limites de l’uniformisation matérielle du droit de la vente internationale (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 
1994) 291ff; V Heuzé (n 44) para 313.  
68 Cour de Justice Genève 10 October 1997 (n 10). 
69 Art 1(2) Swiss Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch) reads: ‘In the absence of a provision, the court 
shall decide in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of customary law, in 
accordance with the rule that it would make as legislator’; see AE von Overbeck, ‘Some 
Observations on the Role of the Judge under the Swiss Civil Code’ (1977) 37 Louisiana 
Law Review 681, 688ff. The court of first instance (Tribunal Geneva 14 March 1997, 
CISG-online 89) had instead applied the general limitation period of ten years (Art 127 
Swiss OR). 
70 P Tannò (n 44) 288; J-M Joerin (n 44) 89ff (reporting an unpublished ICC arbitral 
award in which the sole arbitrator adopted this solution); M Will (n 44) 638; T Koller (n 
32) 53; D Girsberger (n 44) 250; D Akikol, Die Voraussetzungen der Sachmängelhaftung beim 
Warenkauf (Schulthess 2008) 36; G Benedick, Die Informationspflichten im UN-Kaufrecht und 
ihre Verletzung (Stämpfli 2008) para 635ff; P Hachem and F Mohs (n 44) 1548; T 
Murmann and M Stucki (n 44) Art 4 para 23. 
71 Handelsgericht des Kantons Bern (Commercial Court of the Canton Berne) 30 
October 2001, CISG-online 956, [2002] Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales 
und europäisches Recht (SZIER) 142; Handelsgericht des Kantons Bern 17 January 
2002, CISG-online 725, (2003) 21 recht 48. 
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two Greek courts mentioned earlier adopted the same approach when 
applying the former Article 554 Greek Civil Code to CISG contracts.72 A 
few authors agree.73 
3. CHALLENGING THE PREVAILING VIEW: WHY THE CUT-
OFF PERIOD IN ARTICLE 39(2) CISG IS COMPATIBLE WITH 
SHORTER DOMESTIC LIMITATION PERIODS 
Given the impressive cross-border uniformity displayed by courts 
and commentators when it comes to the relationship between Article 
39(2) CISG and shorter statutes of limitation, one might wonder whether 
it is worthwhile, or indeed admissible, to challenge the prevailing view. 
After all, Article 7(1) CISG aims at uniformity in the Convention’s 
application, and this goal would clearly be much easier reached by the few 
remaining sceptics joining the almost uniform ranks, than through a 
further extension of the discussion.  
Luckily, Article 7(1) CISG’s uniformity goal is not quite as strict, and 
should not be read as stymieing an academic exchange of ideas.74 (From a 
formal perspective, it could be pointed out that Article 7(1) CISG’s 
principles are legally binding only for courts in CISG Contracting States,75 
but are a mere inspiration to academic writers.) Maybe more importantly, 
Professor Flechtner has noted that attempts to apply the uniformity 
principle in a rigid or absolutist fashion are generally unjustified by the 
Convention.76 And quite similarly, Professor Lookofsky has reminded us 
that the command of Article 7(1) CISG even to courts ‘does not mean that 
a given CISG majority view is necessarily persuasive, let alone “right”’, and 
that ‘numbers should not count for much, especially if the reasoning of 
the (first-in-time) majority is unpersuasive.’77  
Thus encouraged, I will try to demonstrate that the prevailing view 
in fact has it wrong. My disagreement in this context is not with the general 
position that the CISG should prevail over domestic law in case of an 
incompatibility78 (with this, I do agree), but rather with the assumption 
                                                            
72 Monomeles Protodikio Larisa, Case No 165/2005, reported by E Zervogianni (n 34) 
172ff; Polimeles Protodikio Athinon (n 34) para. 2.2.6. 
73 A Janssen, ‘Verhältnis’ (n 44) 371; F Ferrari (n 44) Art 39 CISG para 34. 
74 See already 1. above. 
75 See J Lookofsky, ‘Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much Regard Should We Have?’ 
(2004) 8 VJ 181, 184: ‘Article 7(1) contains a clear (public international law) command to 
all CISG Contracting States and their courts (…)’. 
76 HM Flechtner, ‘Several Texts’ (n 48) 188. 
77 J Lookofsky, ‘Case Law’ (n 75) 188 (emphases in the original). 
78 See 2.2. above. 
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that Article 39(2) CISG and shorter statutes of limitation are 
incompatible:79 In my opinion, no such incompatibility or conflict exists.80 
3.1. TECHNICAL NATURE OR DOCTRINAL CHARACTERISATION OF TIME-
LIMITS AS THE DECISIVE ISSUE? 
A first possible reason why the CISG’s cut-off rule and domestic 
limitation periods are not in conflict could be that both time-limits belong 
to different categories, from either a technical or a doctrinal perspective. 
In my opinion, such a reasoning should not be followed, irrespective 
whether the focus is on the technical nature or the doctrinal character of 
the time-limits concerned: 
3.1.1. ARTICLE 39(2) CISG’S TECHNICAL NATURE 
As to their technical nature, it has frequently been stressed that limits 
on the time for instituting legal proceedings are technically distinct from 
the cut-off period in Article 39(2) CISG.81 This distinctness appears first 
and foremost in the steps that are needed in order to comply with the 
respective time-limits: While limitation periods require the introduction of 
an action at law as defined in the respective statute of limitation, Article 39 
CISG merely requires a notice of non-conformity to be given to the seller, 
without court action being involved.82 The distinctness further manifests 
itself in a number of technical features that are present in Article 39(2) 
CISG (notably that the cut-off period has to be observed ex officio,83 and 
that it cannot be interrupted or suspended84), but presumably not in 
limitation periods. The latter assumption must nevertheless not necessarily 
be true for all domestic limitation regimes, because of the technical 
                                                            
79 See 2.1. above. 
80 See already P Schlechtriem and UG Schroeter (n 20) para. 428; support in recent 
scholarly writings by R Gildeggen and A Willburger (n 46) 3; P Hachem, ‘Statute of 
Limitations’ (n 46) 163; P Hachem, ‘Verjährungs- und Verwirkungsfragen’ (n 46) 16. 
81 D Girsberger (n 44) 248; JO Honnold and HM Flechtner (n 20) § 261.1; St Kröll (n 44) 
Art 39 para 119; J Lookofsky, ‘Convention’ (n 11) 134; I Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 30; 
K Sono in CM Bianca and MJ Bonell (n 17) Art 39 para 1.9. See also the Secretariat’s 
Commentary (n 22) Art 37 para 6, p 35, stressing that the obligation under Art 39(1) 
CISG to give notice ‘is a completely separate obligation from that to commence judicial 
proceedings under the Prescription Convention’. 
82 Cour d’appel de Versailles 29 January 1998, CISG-online 337. 
83 Oberlandesgericht (Austrian Court of Appeals) Linz 24 September 2007, CISG-
online 1583, (2008) 8 IHR 28, 30; U Magnus in H Honsell (ed), Kommentar zum UN-
Kaufrecht (2nd edn, Springer 2010) Art 39 para 29; St Kröll (n 44) Art 39 para 94; I 
Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 24; C Witz and B Köhler (n 37) 93; doubting whether this 
holds true outside of Europe P Hachem, ‘Verjährungs- und Verwirkungsfragen’ (n 46) 2. 
84 Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 13 February 2007, CISG-online 1562; Cour 
de cassation, chambre commerciale 27 October 2012, CISG-online 2403; P Hachem (n 
79) 1; F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19) Art 39 CISG para 6; A Janssen, ‘Verhältnis’ (n 
44) 369; U Magnus (n 83) Art 39 para 29. 
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differences between the ways in which different domestic laws construct 
the instrument of prescription.85 These differences in turn mean that the 
technical construction of limitation laws cannot in itself be decisive for 
Article 39(2) CISG’s relation toward them, simply because such an 
influence of domestic legal orders would be irreconcilable with the CISG’s 
international character (Article 7(1) CISG).86 
3.1.2. DOCTRINAL CHARACTERISATION OF TIME-LIMITS 
The doctrinal characterisation of the concurring rules is another 
potential point of reference, as it at first sight indeed appears possible to 
distinguish between limitation periods on one hand and cut-off rules like 
Article 39(2) CISG on the other hand, using normative, theoretical 
categories.87 In legal writings, Article 39(2) CISG’s two-year period has 
therefore variously been qualified as not a limitation period, but a period 
of exclusion,88 a statute of repose,89 a Verwirkungsfrist,90 a Präklusionsfrist91 
or an Ausschlussfrist.92 However, these characterisations should neither 
determine the relationship between Article 39(2) CISG and rules of 
domestic law, because the categories used are once more categories of 
domestic legal systems and not of the CISG. This alone is a sufficient 
reason not to rely on time-limits’ character in legal doctrine or ‘domestic 
law ideology’93, as the resulting (albeit indirect) influence of domestic law 
and jurisprudence is – again94 – disfavoured by Article 7(1) CISG. 
                                                            
85 See R Zimmermann (n 23) 769; see also M Müller-Chen in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 
Commentary, (n 16) Art 1 Limitation Convention para 7. 
86 See UG Schroeter, ‘Defining the Borders’ (n 8) 562ff. 
87 See Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 3 February 2009 – Société Novodec / Société 
Sigmakalon v. Soctiétés Mobacc et Sam 7, CISG-online 1843: ‘Attendu qu’en statuant ainsi, alors 
que le délai de deux ans de l’article 39 de la Convention de Vienne est un délai de dénonciation du défaut 
de conformité et non un délai pour agir, la cour d'appel a violé le texte susvisé (...)' (thereby reversing 
and remanding the decision of a lower court that had treated Article 39(2) CISG as a 
limitation period); Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 21 June 2016 – Caterpillar 
Energy Solutions GmbH v A Allianz IARD, CISG-online 2742 (again reversing a decision 
of a lower court); Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 2 November 2016 – Société 
Bois v Société Ceramiche, CISG-online 2804; A Janssen, ‘Verhältnis’ (n 44) 371; P Hachem 
and F Mohs (n 44) 1541;. 
88 F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19) Art 39 CISG para 6. 
89 CP Gillette and SD Walt, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Practice and Theory (LexisNexis 2014) § 5.03[5].  
90 T Koller (n 32) 44. 
91 H Honsell (n 32) 150; P Hachem and F Mohs (n 44) 1541;. 
92 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court) 19 December 2007, CISG-
online 1628 (2008) 8 IHR 106; A Janssen, ‘Verhältnis’ (n 44) 369; U Magnus in J von 
Staudinger’s Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) (Sellier – de 
Gruyther 2012) Art 39 CISG para 63; P Hachem, ‘Verjährungs- und Verwirkungsfragen’ 
(n 46) 2.  
93 This expression is used by HM Flechtner, ‘Several Texts’ (n 48) 200. 
94 See already 3.1.1. above. 
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The decisive question is therefore whether Article 39(2) CISG, when 
interpreted in accordance with Article 7(1) CISG, aims at displacing 
concurring statutes of limitations in part or entirely, or rather wants to 
leave rules of prescription untouched. The Limitation Convention, sister 
convention to the CISG,95 specifically addresses this question of legislative 
intent in its Article 1(2), where it provides that ‘[t]his Convention shall not 
affect a particular time-limit within which one party is required, as a 
condition for the acquisition or exercise of his claim, to give notice to the 
other party or perform any act other than the institution of legal 
proceedings’.96 In explaining the term ‘shall not affect’, the official 
commentary states that the Limitation Convention ‘is not applicable’ to 
time-limits as Article 39(2) CISG and ‘has no effect’ on such rules.97 What 
is not entirely clear is whether this lack of applicability and effect is a 
specific result of Article 1(2) Limitation Convention or would have been 
the case anyway, as the Limitation Convention is at the outset not 
concerned with time-limits for notices of non-conformity. It is 
furthermore interesting to note that the CISG does not include a 
counterpart to Article 1(2) Limitation Convention addressing its 
relationship with statutes of limitation. The Secretariat’s Commentary on 
the draft CISG contains somewhat contrary indications, in that it stresses 
that ‘the principles which lie behind [Article 39(2) CISG and Articles 8, 10 
Limitation Convention] are the same’, only to add that the obligation 
under Article 39(1) CISG to give notice ‘is a completely separate obligation 
from that to commence judicial proceedings under the Prescription 
Convention’.98 Arbitral decisions have stressed the latter point.99 By 
contrast, commentators have argued that it might be difficult to reconcile 
the policies underlying the two Conventions,100 and have even spoken of a 
                                                            
95 See 1.2.2. above. 
96 Art 1(2) Limitation Convention refers to time-limits as those imposed by Art 39 CISG 
(F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19) Art. 2 Limitation Convention para. 8). 
97 K Sono, ‘Commentary on the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International 
Sale of Goods, done at New York, 14 June 1974 (A/CONF.63/17)’ (1979) X 
UNCITRAL Yearbook 145, 149. 
98 Secretariat’s Commentary (n 22) Art 37 para 6, p 35. 
99 ICC Arbitration Case No 7565 of 1994, CISG-online 566, (November 1995) ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin (ICC Bull) 63: Art 39(2) CISG ‘has nothing 
to see with claims or other means of action in justice. It just deals with notice of a lack 
of conformity which must take place within two years from the delivery of the goods. It 
leaves entirely open the matter of the time during which, after that notice, a Claimant 
may or may not file its claim within a Court or an Arbitral Tribunal. This matter depends 
on the proper law of limitation (...)’; ICC Arbitration Case No 7660 of 1994, (November 
1995) ICC Bull 69. 
100 K Sono in CM Bianca und MJ Bonell (n 17) Art 39 para 1.10. During the preparatory 
work on the CISG within UNCITRAL, the conflict between the different policies was 
frequently noted and discussed; see (1973) IV UNCITRAL Yearbook 13, 48, 49, 66–67 
and (1975) VI UNCITRAL Yearbook 99–100. 
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‘clash of policies’ between the two time-limits.101 These concerns in turn 
support the view that notice requirements like those of Article 39 CISG and 
limitation periods, while belonging to doctrinally separate categories of 
rules, may still collide where results of their respective application interfere. 
To the present author, the correct answer to the above question is 
not obvious. Given the complexity of the problem and the fact that it does 
not merely arise in the context discussed here, but is of a more general 
nature, the present contribution is not a suitable place to attempt a 
solution. Rather, this must be left for another day. For the remaining part 
of the contribution, I will therefore proceed under the assumption that 
statute of limitations can be incompatible with rules on notices of non-
conformity at least where they interfere with the intended functioning of 
such rules,102 thereby accepting arguendo an assumption (implicitly) 
underlying the prevailing view. 
3.2. PROTECTION OF THE SELLER’S (AND NOT THE BUYER’S) INTERESTS 
AS ARTICLE 39(2) CISG’S SOLE PURPOSE 
The decisive factor must therefore be the interpretation of Article 
39(2) CISG, which has to elucidate whether the concurrent application of 
a shorter limitation period to a buyer’s rights is really incompatible with 
the two-year cut-off rule. It is submitted that the answer is in the negative: 
3.2.1. ARTICLE 39(2) CISG’S PURPOSE 
As a starting point, it must be noted that in order to be able to 
conflict with any shorter time-limit, Article 39(2) CISG would have to be 
read as fixing a two-year minimum period for giving notice. And the 
prevailing view103 indeed interprets Article 39(2) CISG variously as 
granting the buyer two years within which to give notice that the goods 
were non-conforming,104 as essentially protecting the buyer from hidden 
defects during two years105 or as providing the buyer with a duty, but also 
with a right to give notice of non-conformity within two years after 
                                                            
101 K Sono in CM Bianca and MJ Bonell (n 17) Art 39 para 1.12. 
102 Whether such an interference really exists in case of Art 39(2) CISG will be 
investigated in 3.2. below. 
103 See in detail 2.1. above. 
104 Sky Cast, Inc v Global Direct Distribution, LLC, US District Court (Eastern District of 
Kentucky) 18 March 2008, CISG-online 1652: ‘Assuming the light poles were non-
conforming because of the delay in shipments, under Article 39, it appears that Global 
[i.e. the buyer] had two years from the date of delivery of the light poles to the 
construction project within which to give Sky Cast [i.e. the seller] notice that the goods 
were non-conforming.’ But see the critical remarks about this judgment by I Bach, 
‘Neuere Rechtsprechung zum UN-Kaufrecht’ [2009] IPRax 299, 303 (‘geht doppelt fehl’), 
by I Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 30 n 159 (‘incorrect’) and by CP Gillette and SD Walt 
(n 89) § 5.03[5]. 
105 U Magnus (n 83) Art 39 para 29: ‘Die Vorschrift [Art 39(2) CISG] schützt den Käufer damit 
im Ergebnis für zwei Jahre vor verborgenen Sachmängeln.’ 
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handing over of the goods.106 It is submitted that it is with this 
understanding of Article 39(2) CISG that the prevailing view goes wrong: 
The construction just described is for once at odds with the wording 
of Article 39(2) CISG, which makes no positive statement whatsoever 
about the time for giving a notice granted to the buyer; the provision in 
contrast only stipulates a further reason (‘In any event, (…)’) why the 
buyer loses his right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods. Its 
common description as a ‘cut-off rule’ points in the same direction. In 
addition, Article 39(2) CISG’s purpose makes amply clear that the 
provision is of no help to the buyer, but only to the seller.107 The 
Secretariat’s Commentary describes the purpose as: 
‘to protect the seller against claims which arise long after the goods have been 
delivered. Claims made long after the goods have been delivered are often of doubtful 
validity and when the seller receives his first notice of such a contention at a late date, it 
would be difficult for him to obtain evidence as to the condition of the goods at the time 
of delivery, or to invoke the liability of a supplier from whom the seller may have obtained 
the goods or the materials for their manufacture. Paragraph (2) recognizes this interest 
by requiring the buyer to give the seller notice of the non-conformity at the latest two 
years from the date the goods were actually handed over to him.’108 
In the same vein, courts applying the Convention have held that the 
provision serves to provide the seller with certainty that he no longer 
needs to reckon with claims after a certain point in time, and that he may 
finally regard the transaction as finished.109 
Finally, the drafting history of Article 39(2) CISG indicates the 
protection of the seller as its sole designated purpose. In fact, concerns 
were raised at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference that buyers ‘might 
be unduly penalized’110 by Article 39(2) CISG, and the provision was 
criticised as ‘draconian’ from the buyer’s point of view.111 More recently, 
Article 39(2) CISG has even been challenged for allegedly violating the 
buyer’s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights.112 On the contrary, nobody seems to have 
                                                            
106 A Janssen, ‘Verhätltnis’ (n 44) 369: ‘dass der Käufer grundsätzlich die Pflicht, aber auch das 
Recht hat, Vertragswidrigkeiten der Ware innerhalb von zwei Jahren ab Übergabe anzuzeigen’. 
107 See also St Kröll (n 44) Art 39 paras 7, 12: ‘The primary purpose of Art 39 is to protect 
the interests of the seller in the finality of transactions.’ On the purpose of Art 39(2) 
CISG in particular, see already F Enderlein and D Maskow (n 19); A Janssen, ‘Chapter 
16: Examination and Notice of Non-Conformity’ in LA DiMatteo and others (eds), 
International Sales Law: Contract, Principles & Practice (Nomos 2016) 429, 459 para 82. 
108 Secretariat’s Commentary (n 22) Art 37 paras 5–6, p 35. 
109 Oberster Gerichtshof 19 December 2007 (n 91), cites I Schwenzer in P Schlechtriem 
and I Schwenzer (eds), Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (4th edn, CH Beck 2004) 
Art 39 para 22. 
110 Delegate Date-Bah (Ghana) in Official Records (n 22) 320, No 32. 
111 Delegate O’Flynn (United Kingdom) in Official Records (n 22) 320, No 35. 
112 See Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 16 September 2008 – Société Industrielle et 
Agricole du Pays de Caux (SIAC) v Agrico Cooperatieve Handelsvereiniging Voor 
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considered the cut-off rule as potentially helpful for the buyer’s position, 
as it was never designed to be. Against this background, it is unconvincing 
to draw from Article 39(2) CISG a minimum two-year notice period in 
favour of the buyer, which could be disturbed by the application of shorter 
domestic limitation periods. 
3.2.2. ARTICLE 39(2) CISG AS A SUPPLEMENT TO ARTICLE 39(1) CISG 
It is furthermore necessary to take into account Article 39(2) CISG’s 
systematic position within the Convention. The provision supplements 
Article 39(1) CISG,113 which in turn positively defines the time frame 
available to the buyer for giving notice, namely ‘a reasonable time’ after he 
has discovered the non-conformity or ought to have discovered it. The 
supplementary function of Article 39(2) CISG has equally been neglected 
by the proponents of the prevailing view, thereby contributing to the 
misunderstanding about the cut-off rule’s purpose and effect: 
It is Article 39(1) CISG which – first – provides that the buyer only 
has to give notice of non-conformity if he has discovered the non-
conformity or ought to have discovered it, and – second – thereafter 
grants the buyer a ‘reasonable time’ for giving notice (instead of requiring 
notice to be given ‘promptly’, as the predecessor in Article 39(1) ULIS 
did), with the time’s reasonability inter alia being influenced by the buyer’s 
skill (or lack thereof).114 Article 39(1) CISG accordingly also protects the 
buyer’s interests through these two requirements,115 although the notice 
requirement primarily serves the seller’s interest.116 Article 39(1) CISG 
does not, however, guarantee that the buyer’s opportunity to give notice 
remains undisturbed for two years, but merely for a reasonable time. To 
this scenario, Article 39(2) CISG adds its two-year cut-off rule which ‘[i]n 
                                                            
Akkerbouwgewassen BA, CISG-online 1821, D 2009, 1568 with note by C Witz. (The 
French Supreme Court rejected the argument for procedural reasons.) 
113 J Lookofsky, ‘Convention’ (n 11) 134. 
114 Oberlandesgericht (German Court of Appeals) Munich 11 March 1998, CISG-
online 310: ‘A thorough and expert examination of the goods can be expected from a 
business of [buyer]’s size, which owns various retail stores (...)’; Shuttle Packaging Systems v 
Tsonakis, US District Court (Western District of Michigan) 17 December 2001, CISG-
online 773: ‘The [buyer]’s employees lacked the expertise to inspect the goods and needed 
to rely on [seller]’s engineers even to use the equipment (...)’; Gerechtshof [Dutch 
Appellate Court] Arnhem 18 July 2006, CISG-online 1266, para. 5.7: ‘When determining 
a reasonable time for notice of defects, it is finally relevant, that [buyer] is a professional 
and – facing the amount of compensation requested – a large scale manufacturer’; Miami 
Valley Paper, LLC v Lebbing Engineering & Consulting GmbH, US District Court (Southern 
District of Ohio) 26 March 2009, CISG-online 1880; St Kröll (n 44) Art 39 para 76. 
115 See U Magnus (n 92) Art 39 CISG para 4; I Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 1. 
116 J Lookofsky, ‘Understanding’ (n 4) §4.9: purpose underlying Art 39(1) CISG ’is to 
provide the seller with a reasonable and timely opportunity to consider and perhaps 
refute a given non-conformity claim, as well as an opportunity to cure an existing defect. 
etc.’; St Kröll (n 44) Art 39 paras 7, 12 (citation in n 107).  
NJCL 2017/2 
 
175 
any event’ takes away the buyer’s right to rely on a lack of conformity once 
two years have passed since the goods were actually handed over, 
notwithstanding the fact that the buyer could at no point in time discover 
the respective non-conformity.117 Article 39(2) CISG accordingly does not 
give the buyer any time at all; it only takes away rights that other provisions 
in the CISG have given him. If one were to liken Article 39 CISG to a 
‘good cop, bad cop’ scenario with the buyer as the subject, Article 39(1) 
CISG would occupy the role of the (to a limited extent) good cop, with 
Article 39(2) CISG resembling the aggressive, purely negative colleague. 
This role once more excludes any potential for conflict with concurring 
limitation periods if it arises from the aim to preserve the buyer’s rights. 
Article 39(2) CISG’s merely supplementary function has yet another 
effect on its relation to statutes of limitation, albeit only an indirect one: 
As the cut-off rule only applies to cases in which the reasonable time for 
giving notice under Article 39(1) CISG has not yet expired118 (most often 
because the non-conformity has remained hidden, so that the reasonable 
time has not even started to run), Article 39(2) CISG’s alleged pre-emptive 
effect could similarly only apply in situations in which the reasonable 
notice period has not passed. In case law following the prevailing view,119 
this was sometimes overlooked, with short domestic limitation periods 
being treated as displaced although the cut-off rule did not even apply in 
the particular case, given that the buyer had to comply with Article 39(1) 
CISG.120 Article 39(2) CISG’s pre-emptive effect accordingly reached 
further than the scope of the provision – a further sign of the prevailing 
view’s weaknesses. 
3.2.3. SUMMARY 
Contrary to the currently prevailing opinion, Article 39(2) CISG is 
not incompatible with limitation periods of less than two years of length, 
because the CISG’s cut-off rule neither according to its wording and 
legislative history nor to its purpose and systematic position within the 
                                                            
117 See Oberster Gerichtshof 19 December 2007 (n 91) 108; P Schlechtriem (n 16) 70 
who speaks of ’the absolute exclusion of all claims after two years, whether or not the 
defects were discoverable during that time’; U Magnus (n 92) Art 39 CISG para 63. 
118 Oberster Gerichtshof 19 May 1999, CISG-online 484; Audiencia Provincial (Spanish 
Appellate Court) de Pontevedra 8 February 2007, CISG-online 1802; Oberster 
Gerichtshof 19 December 2007 (n 92) 108; see also I Schwenzer (n 16) Art 39 para 23: 
Art 39(2) CISG applies furthermore where the buyer has a reasonable excuse in 
accordance with Art 44 CISG. 
119 See 2.1.1. above. 
120 Cour de Justice Genève 10 October 1997 (n 10) 146: notice given by buyer within 
reasonable time (Art 39(1) CISG), but statute of limitation (former Art 210(1) Swiss OR) 
nevertheless held to be displaced by Art 39(2) CISG; Tribunale di Bolzano 27 January 
2009, (n 35) 43: notice given by buyer within reasonable time (Art 39(1) CISG), but 
statute of limitation (Art 1495(3) Italian Civil Code) nevertheless held to be displaced by 
Art 39(2) CISG. 
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Convention aims at granting the buyer two years for giving notice of non-
conformity. Correctly understood, Article 39(2) CISG protects exclusively 
the interests of the seller, and not the buyer; it can therefore not be in 
conflict with statutes of limitations which give the buyer less than two 
years’ time for commencing legal proceedings.  
3.3. THE ‘REASONABLE TIME’ UNDER ARTICLE 39(1) CISG AS THE ONLY 
RULE IN THE CISG POTENTIALLY AFFECTING DOMESTIC STATUTES 
OF LIMITATION 
Accepting the non-prevailing interpretation of Article 39(2) CISG 
suggested here121 does nevertheless not mean that all potential for conflict 
between Article 39 CISG and brief domestic limitation periods is 
removed. But the conflicting provision within Article 39 CISG is a 
different one: Instead of the cut-off rule in Article 39(2) CISG, it is the 
rule in Article 39(1) CISG governing the details of the required notice of 
non-conformity, in particular its time-frame (‘within a reasonable time 
after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it’) that may be 
incompatible with brief domestic statutes of limitation. 
3.3.1. SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL 
The reason is that the ‘within reasonable time’ requirement in Article 
39(1) CISG – as noted earlier122 – is indeed supposed to protect the buyer’s 
interests, insofar as it no longer requires the notice to be given ‘promptly’ 
and takes into account the buyer’s skills. In case a domestic limitation 
period expires before the ‘reasonable time’ under Article 39(1) CISG has 
passed, domestic law may therefore indeed infringe upon the buyer’s rights 
as given to him by the Convention, if one accepts the assumption that 
time-limits for giving notice of non-conformity and limitation periods can 
conflict at all.123 
In order to determine whether such a conflict exists, one cannot 
resort to an abstract, numerical comparison of the notice period under 
Article 39(1) CISG and the respective limitation period, because the time-
limit of Article 39(1) CISG is fact-specific, requiring an assessment 
according to the circumstances of each particular case.124 It is accordingly 
necessary to determine when the ‘reasonable time’ granted to the buyer 
has passed under the circumstances at hand, and whether the applicable 
domestic limitation period has expired before this point in time. If it has, 
we are faced with a conflict of norms, which has to be resolved in favour 
                                                            
121 See 3.2. above. 
122 See 3.2.2. above. 
123 See 3.1.2. in fine above. 
124 See Miami Valley Paper (n 114); CP Gillette and SD Walt (n 89) § 5.03[1]. 
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of the Convention’s time-limit in line with one of the approaches 
developed by courts under Article 39(2) CISG.125 
3.3.2. ‘REASONABLE TIME’ V. ‘BREF DÉLAI’: A POSSIBLE CASE OF 
CONFLICT 
In view of the experience with the interpretation of Article 39(1) 
CISG’s ‘reasonable time’ and notwithstanding the ‘crazy decisional quilt’126 
that has developed in this context, courts have relatively rarely concluded 
that a period of more than one or two months was still reasonable for 
giving notice of non-conformity,127 although such cases have occasionally 
occurred.128 This raises the question whether there is a relevant likelihood 
of domestic limitation periods falling short of Article 39(1) CISG’s period. 
Such situations will probably be rare, though at least three possible 
constellations come to mind: First, a few domestic laws know limitation 
periods which only run for thirty or sixty days,129 thereby using a fixed 
time-limit that may occasionally be briefer than Article 39(1) CISG’s 
‘reasonable time’. Second, statutes of limitation not infrequently let their 
limitation begin to run with the delivery of the goods, irrespective of the 
non-conformity’s recognisability: In cases of hidden defects (i.e. the ones 
also governed by Article 39(2) CISG), such limitation periods may well 
expire before the reasonable notice period, which under Article 39(1) 
CISG only commences once the buyer ought to have discovered the non-
conformity. And third, the bref délai for actions in cases of hidden defects 
modelled on the former Article 1648 French Civil Code130 may collide with 
Article 39(1) CISG – a conflict potential that deserves closer 
consideration. 
Commencing with the plain language of bref délai rules (‘within a 
short time’), it may at first appear that such limitation periods will 
frequently expire earlier than the ‘reasonable time’ of Article 39(1) CISG. 
The legislative history of Article 38 CISG seems to support this 
expectation, given that a (similarly framed) ‘short period’ was clearly 
regarded as shorter than a ‘reasonable time’.131 In practice, however, the 
former Article 1648 French Civil Code was often construed more 
generously, so that the conflict potential between the bref délai requirement 
and Article 39(1) CISG may be narrower than it first appears: On one 
hand, the French courts have predominantly ruled that the bref délai only 
                                                            
125 See 2.2. above; in agreement P Hachem, ‘Statute of Limitations’ (n 46), 164; P 
Hachem, ‘Verjährungs und Verwirkungsfragen’ (n 46) 17. 
126 J Lookofsky, ‘Case Law’ (n 75) 193. 
127 See U Magnus (n 92) Art 39 CISG para 41. 
128 See P Schlechtriem and UG Schroeter (n 20) para 414. 
129 For examples, see 1.2.2. above. 
130 See 1.2.2. above. 
131 Compare the extensive discussions about a Canadian proposal (UN Doc. 
A/CONF.97/C.1/L.118) to modify the wording of today’s Art 38(1) CISG accordingly; 
see Official Records (n 22) 106 (proposal) and 310–12 (discussion). 
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begins to run once the defect is discovered by the buyer, and not already 
on the moment of delivery.132 And on the other hand, the ‘short’ (bref) 
period has often been measured rather tolerantly, with actions brought 
after two133 or more than three years134 having been accepted as still 
meeting the bref délai requirement. On at least one occasion, the former 
Article 1648 French Civil Code has even been interpreted in light of Article 
39(2) CISG and its two-year period.135 
In addition to the generous interpretation of bref délai rules, the scope 
of such rules has often been narrowly construed within domestic 
limitation laws. Buyers’ actions under CISG contracts have therefore 
frequently been subjected to (longer) general limitation periods instead of 
bref délai rules,136 as the latter are usually designated for certain categories 
of defects only, as notably the vices rédhibitoires of Article 1648 French Civil 
Code. Due to the construction of these limitation rules in practice, their 
conflict potential with Article 39(1) CISG turns out to be relatively small. 
However, there remains the possibility that a bref délai will in some 
circumstances expire before the ‘reasonable time’ for giving notice under 
the Convention has passed. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the 
bref délai-style limitation periods that remain in force today, as eg those in 
Belgium, Benin, Congo, Gabon, Guinea and Luxembourg as well as in a 
number of non-CISG Contracting States in francophone Africa,137 should 
be regarded as pre-empted, in order to preserve the time for giving notice 
of non-conformity that the Convention grants the buyer through Article 
39(1) CISG. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The time-limits applicable to the buyer’s rights under the CISG in 
cases of non-conforming goods are a borderline issue, in that the 
Convention’s rules compete with domestic laws on the limitation 
                                                            
132 Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale 22 November 1965, Bulletin des arrêts des 
chambres civiles de la Cour de cassation (Bull civ) III, No 593; Cour de cassation, 
chambre commerciale 18 February 1992, Bull civ IV, No 82; see also V Heuzé (n 44) 
para 313. Slightly different J Ghestin and B Desché, Traité des Contrats: La Vente (LGDJ 
1990) para 737, who focus on the defect’s decoverability. Note that since its reform in 
2005, Art 1648 French Civil Code explicitly specifies the beginning of the period (‘(...) à 
compter de la découverte du vice’). 
133 Cour appel de Paris 26 June 1980 – Savie v Logabax, cited in J Ghestin and B Desché 
(n 132) para 737. 
134 ibid. 
135 ICC Arbitration Case No 8453 of October 1995, CISG-online 1275 (Fall 2000) ICC 
Bull 55 (although the arbitral tribunal ruled that the CISG was inapplicable to the contract 
at hand). 
136 ICC Arbitration Case No 11333 of 2002 (n 20) 126 (applying the ten-year limitation 
period of Art 189bis French Commercial Code); V Heuzé (n 44) para 313: ‘la seule solution 
raisonnable’. 
137 See 1.2.2. above. 
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(prescription) of actions.138 The prevailing view among courts, academic 
writers and domestic legislators regards the perceived incompatibility 
between the two-year cut-off period in Article 39(2) CISG and shorter 
domestic limitation periods as the main area of conflict, eventually arguing 
that Article 39(2) CISG must prevail over domestic law.139 The present 
contribution has tried to demonstrate that this prevailing view 
misunderstands the purpose of the cut-off period in Article 39(2) CISG, 
resulting in its time-limit indeed ‘running wild’. A more convincing 
construction leads to a parallel application of the two-year cut-off period 
and shorter limitation periods.140 
There nevertheless remains an area of conflict between uniform 
international and domestic time-limits, namely between the ‘reasonable 
time’ in Article 39(1) CISG and short domestic limitation periods:141 If a 
limitation period exceptionally expires while the buyer’s reasonable time 
for giving notice of non-conformity is still running, the domestic statute 
of limitation must be regarded as pre-empted by Article 39(1) CISG. As 
this effect on domestic laws is restricted to situations in which there is an 
actual discrepancy between the two time frames under the circumstances 
of the case at hand, incompatibilities will be much less frequent than under 
the prevailing view, which compares the fixed length of the two time-limits 
in an abstract manner. In consequence, the approach presented here may 
well depart from an (almost) uniformly held view on the matter, but 
promises to deliver a more convincingly defined scope of the Convention 
in return. 
                                                            
138 See 1.2. above. 
139 See 2. above. 
140 See 3.1., 3.2. above. 
141 See 3.3. above. 
